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EXPRESSION AND APPEARANCE: A COMMENT ON HELLMAN
MATrHEW D. ADLER*
In her subtle and interesting article, entitled Judging by Appear-
ances: Professional Ethics, Expressive Government, and the Moral Signifi-
cance of How Things Seem,1 Deborah Hellman sheds new light on the
expressive dimension of governmental action. The first part of the
article defends an appearance-based theory of governmental action: not
only are certain officials morally obliged not to engage in various sorts
of wrongdoing, but they also have moral reason not to appear to en-
gage in wrongdoing.2 As Hellman puts it: officials may be obligated
to refrain from performing "mimetic wrongs," that is, actions which
are wrong because they resemble other, "nonmimetic" wrongs.3 The
second part of Hellman's article considers possible linkages between
appearance-based theories and expressive theories.4 If governmental
actors are constrained from performing mimetic wrongs, are they also
constrained from expressing (or failing to express) various attitudes
or propositions? Hellman's answer to this question is a qualified "no":
Appearance-based theories of governmental action do not generally
entail expressive theories of governmental action. A limited class of
appearance-based theories-those focused on the mental states pos-
sessed by government actors-do entail expressive theories.5 Hellman
thinks, however, that this focus on mental states is problematic.6
Like Hellman, I am skeptical about the relevance of governmen-
tal actors' mental states, and thus about the connection between ap-
pearance-based theories and expressive-theories. Unlike Hellman, I
am not convinced that there is any appearance-based theory of gov-
ernmental action that is viable. But I must emphasize that Judging by
* Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.A., J.D., Yale University; M.
Litt., Oxford University. Many thanks for helpful comments to Sarah Buss, Deborah
Hellman, and the participants in the Maryland Law Review Symposium on "The Expressive
Dimension of Governmental Action."
1. 60 MD. L. REv. 653 (2001).
2. See id. at 654-76.
3. See id. at 654. Hellman borrows the term "mimetic" from Julia Driver, who devel-
oped an appearance-based theory in Caesar's Wife: On the Moral Significance of Appearing
Good, 89J. PHIL. 331, 335 (1992). Hellman's theory, however, is significantly different from
Driver's. For example, Hellman's theory is deontological in structure, while the theory
proposed by Driver is consequentialist.
4. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 676-86.
5. See id. at 677-81, 683-84.
6. See id. at 681-84.
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Appearances is an important contribution to the literature on expressiv-
ism'-given the possible connection between mimetic and expressive
theories-and may well spark a whole new scholarly literature about
the moral significance of apparent government wrongdoing.
I. IS IT WRONG TO APPEAR TO ENGAGE IN WRONGDOING?
Let me begin by describing and examining Hellman's argument
for the moral importance of appearance-for the claim that certain
government officials and other agents are morally obliged not to ap-
pear to engage in moral wrongdoing. There are three crucial features
of Hellman's account. First, the account is relationship-based. Argua-
bly, morality incorporates various special relationships-for example,
the relationships between friends, parents and their children, fellow
citizens, teachers and students, or governing officials and those they
govern-such that the parties to these relationships owe special moral
obligations to each other.8 Hellman suggests that the obligation not
to engage in mimetic wrongdoing is a relationship-based obligation:
it is owed by one party in a special relationship (or in certain special
relationships) to the other parties.9 Second, and relatedly, Hellman's
account is nonconsequentialist. She grants that an agent's performance
of an action that appears to be wrong may cause bad consequences, of
various kinds-the action may induce others to engage in nonmimetic
wrongdoing (by inducing them to believe that what the agent appears
to have done is not wrong after all), or it may cause distress to onlook-
ers-but these contingent effects of apparent wrongdoing are not
Hellman's focus. Rather, she argues that the party to a relationship
(or at least to a certain kind of relationship) has a reason to refrain
from apparent wrongdoing which is nonconsequentialist in structure
and which obtains even in the case where the creation of the appear-
7. See generally Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U.
PA. L. REv. 1363 (2000) (surveying the literature on expressive theories of law and criticiz-
ing expressive theories as unpersuasive); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expres-
sive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503 (2000) (clarifying and
defending expressive theories).
8. For general discussions of special relationships and their place within morality, see,
for example, PERSON TO PERSON (George Graham & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1989); SHELLY
KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 125-37 (1998); Hugh LaFollette, Personal Relationships, in A COM-
PANION TO ETHICS 327 (Peter Singer ed., 1991); Samuel Scheffier, Relationships and Responsi-
bilities, 26 PHIL. & PUB. Air. 189 (1997). Much of the philosophical literature on special
relationships is focused on particular kinds of relationships, such as friendship, see, e.g.,
Marilyn Friedman, Friendship and Moral Growth, 23 J. VALUE INQUIRY 3 (1989); James 0.
Grunebaum, Friendship, Morality, and Special Obligation, 30 AM. PHIL. Q. 51 (1993); or citi-
zenship, see, e.g., A. John Simmons, Associative Political Obligations, 106 ETHICS 247 (1996).
9. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 665-66.
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ance of wrongdoing does not cause harms.'" Finally, Hellman's ac-
count draws a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable beliefs
about the occurrence of moral wrongdoing." The participant in a
special relationship is not obliged to refrain from an action merely
because the action will lead other parties to believe that the actor has
done wrong; after all, these beliefs might be completely unreasonable
and unjustified. Rather, the appearance-based obligation described
by Hellman is an obligation to refrain from actions that other parties
reasonably (even if mistakenly) believe to be nonmimetically
wrongful.
12
Hellman's account might be schematized as follows:
A Deontological, Relationship-Based Account of Mimetic
Wrongdoing:
Morality incorporates special relationships. Assume that {P1
... Pn} are the parties to some such special relationship R.
This means that a given party, P* is subject to various first-
order or nonmimetic deontological reasons or considera-
tions, intrinsic to the relationship. Call these {R1 . . . Rn}.
In any choice situation, P* is obliged, in virtue of the rela-
tionship R, to choose that option favored by the balance of
{R1... Rn}. It is further the case-at least in certain special
relationships, and for certain parties-that P* is subject to a
deontological, mimetic requirement. P* has deontological
reason not to choose some option that some other, Pi, rea-
sonably believes to be wrong on the balance of the
nonmimetic, relationship-based reasons {RI . . . Rn}.
This has relevance for governmental officials because Hellman thinks
that officials are parties to some special relationships-specifically, to
some of the special relationships that generate deontological reasons
against mimetic wrongdoing.13
Is this account plausible? Hellman's account, as I have character-
ized it, assumes that special relationships generate moral reasons,
binding upon the participants to the relationship, that are deontologi-
cal in form. This is a contestable assumption. To explain why, I
should say just a bit about the distinction between consequentialist
and nonconsequentialist (that is, deontological) reasons. Consequen-
tialist reasons are, roughly, features of outcomes or world-states that
have the same moral force for all agents. For example, the fact that a
10. See id. at 655, 673-76.
11. Id. at 659.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 676-77.
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given world-state, W1, contains greater overall well-being than another
world-state, W2, is (according to utilitarians) a moral reason for all
agents to choose actions leading to W1 rather than W2. By contrast,
deontological reasons are, roughly, features of outcomes or world-
states that have different moral force for different agents. 4 For exam-
14. This may seem an odd characterization of deontological reasons. To see why I
adopt it, consider two other possible characterizations of the distinction between conse-
quentialist and deontological reasons: (1) "Consequentialists are concerned with the
causal consequences of actions, while deontologists are concerned with actions themselves.
Consequentialist reasons are features of the outcomes that result from action, while deon-
tological reasons are features of actions themselves." The problem with this characteriza-
tion is that deontologists do care about the causal consequences of actions. For example,
the deontological constraint against killing is a constraint against performing actions that
cause death in a certain way. (2) "Deontological reasons are reasons to perform actions
whose consequences are (or may be) worse than the consequences of alternative options.
Deontological reasons are reasons that can oblige agents to produce worse outcomes. For
example, the deontological reason to refrain from killing can oblige the agent to refrain
from killing even in the case where her act of killing would avert other killings and would
therefore have better consequences than not-killing." The problem with this characteriza-
tion is that it makes classification of a particular reason or theory as deontological or conse-
quentialist depend upon the answer to the question, "What is a good outcome?" What
makes outcomes better or worse is a question of substantive moral theory, one that is hotly
debated by moral philosophers. The conceptual task of classifying moral theories and rea-
sons as "deontological" or "consequentialist" is one that we should be able to undertake
without first resolving the substantive debate about the nature of good outcomes.
A third, and better, characterization of the distinction between consequentialist and
deontological reasons is one that analyzes the former as "agent-neutral" reasons and the
latter as "agent-relative" reasons. A reason is a feature of the outcome produced by some
action-either some aspect of the causal consequences of the action, or some feature of
the action itself. Both consequentialists and deontologists adduce reasons to perform or
refrain from actions. Both care about outcomes (in the sense of pointing to some aspect of
the outcome produced by an action as grounds for performing or refraining from that
action). But consequentialist reasons are "agent-neutral": these are criteria for ranking
outcomes that generate the same ranking regardless of which person is applying the crite-
ria. Deontological reasons are "agent-relative": these are criteria that generate different
rankings, depending on which person is applying them. For example, the fact that an
action maximizes overall well-being is (according to utilitarians) a reason for the agent to
perform the action. That reason is "agent neutral": how outcomes { W1 ... Wn} compare
with respect to overall well-being does not depend on which person is doing the compari-
son. By contrast, the fact that an action would increase the welfare of the agent's child is
(according to some deontologists) a reason for the agent to perform the action. That
reason is "agent relative": how outcomes { W1 ... Wn} compare with respect to the welfare
of the agent's child depends, of course, on who the agent is. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel,
Autonomy and Deontology, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 142, 156-67 (Samuel Schef-
fler ed., 1988) (explaining the concept of "agent-neutral" and "agent-relative" reasons, and
deploying that concept to distinguish between consequentialist and deontological views);
Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra, at 187, 187-
223 (same); David McNaughton & Piers Rawling, Agent-Relativity and the Doing-Happening
Distinction, 63 PHIL. STUD. 167 (1991) (same). For other, general discussions of the distinc-
tion between "deontological" and "consequentialist" moral reasons and theories, see KA-
CAN, supra note 8, at 70-152; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26-53 (1974);
SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 80-114 (rev. ed. 1994); Richard
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pie, the fact thatJim performs a killing in a given world-state, W1, and
refrains from performing that killing in a another world-state, W2, is
(according to deontologists) an especially weighty moral reason for
Jim to choose W2 over Wi; other agents may have less reason than Jim
to disfavor W1. From Jim's point of view, W1 (the world in which he
kills) is morally worse than W2 (the world in which he refrains from
killing), but it may not be true that W1 is worse than W2 from the
point of view of other agents, or from an "impartial" point of view. To
see this, imagine that W1 is a world in which Jim kills and in which
Jules refrains from killing, while W2 is a world in which Jules kills but
Jim refrains from killing. Then, on the deontological account of kill-
ing, W1 is morally worse than W2 from Jim's point of view, while W2 is
morally worse than W1 from Jules's point of view.
A deontological account of special relationships makes a similar
claim. 5 Assume that Sean is a parent and thereby has a special rela-
tionship to his daughter, Sue. This relationship generates various de-
ontological moral reasons {R1 ... Rn} for Sean. Each parent has a
deontological reason, R1, that his child's basic needs be satisfied, a
deontological reason, R2, that his child's important goals be fulfilled,
and so on. So, Sean has a deontological reason, R1, that Sue's basic
needs be satisfied, a deontological reason, R2, that Sue's important
goals be fulfilled, and so on. That is, if W1 is a world in which Sue's
basic needs are satisfied and her important goals are fulfilled, and this
is not true of W2, then Sean has a moral reason to choose W1 over W2
Brook, Is Smith Obliged That (She) Not Kill the Innocent or That She (Not Kill the Innocent):
Expressions and Rationales for Deontological Constraints, 35 S.J. PHIL. 451 (1997); F. M. Kamm,
Non-consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself and the Significance of Status, 21 PHIL. &
PuB. AFF. 354 (1992).
15. David McNaughton and Piers Rawling nicely summarize the deontological account
of special relationships:
[T]here are duties which stem from special relationships: duties which I owe to
some specified individuals because of the relationship in which I stand to them.
Instances of such relationships include those of parent to child, spouse to spouse,
friend to friend, as well as purely contractual relationships, such as those of prom-
iser to promisee, of debtor to lender. Why do these relationships generate [deon-
tological] reasons? Because in each case the agent's reason for acting, her
obligation to act, stems from the fact that she stands in this particular relation to
another. The fact that Alex is Lee's child gives her a reason to look after him
which is not shared by anyone who is not also Alex's parent. This is not to say that
we have no duty whatever to be concerned about the welfare of other people's
children, only that each of us has a distinct and special reason to be concerned
about our own.
David McNaughton & Piers Rawling, On Defending Deontology, 11 RATIO 37, 39 (1998); see
also Scheffler, supra note 8 (presenting a general account of special relationships, which
views them as generating moral responsibilities that are, seemingly, deontological in
structure).
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which is grounded in Sue's needs and goals and which is not pos-
sessed by other agents, or even by other parents. Tim, the parent of
Tom, could have a deontological moral reason to choose the other
way, if W1 is worse for Tom's needs and goals even though better for
Sue's. And a childless actor, one not bound by the deontological obli-
gations of parenthood, would properly ignore {R1 . . . Rn} in deter-
mining what actions he was morally obliged to choose.
Hellman's deontological account of special relationships is con-
troversial in two ways. First, consequentialist scholars such as Peter
Railton and Shelly Kagan have argued that special relationships can
and should be understood in consequentialist terms. 16 The conse-
quentialist, in effect, sees a particular special relationship (parent-
hood, friendship, citizenship) as a particular kind of "project," a
particular set of valuable activities. Parenthood means, inter alia, car-
ing for the child in a direct way, playing a supervisory role in his life,
and educating him; similarly, friendship means a certain kind of inti-
mate association and mutual dependence between friends. The con-
sequentialist, then, argues that all agents have equal moral reason to
promote the various valuable activities constitutive of special relation-
ships. For example, on the consequentialist account of parenthood,
all agents have equal moral reason that parents educate their chil-
dren. Sean, the parent of Sue, has moral reason to educate Sue (be-
cause that is a valuable activity); but Tim also has moral reason to
promote valuable activities, and thus specifically has moral reason that
Sean educate Sue; and Ron, the childless one, also is subject to the
very same moral reason. If Sean educates Sue in W5, but not in W6,
then, ceteris paribus, W5 is a morally better world from the point of view
of Sean, Tim, and Ron.
But isn't parenthood more than a set of valuable activities? Isn't
it the case that the genuine parent performs such activities on the
grounds that the child's needs, welfare, and goals have special weight
for him-that is, on deontological grounds? Some consequentialists
simply deny that the activities constitutive of special relationships
need be motivated by deontological reasoning; 7 other consequential-
ists suggest that the parties to special relationships may engage in de-
ontological reasoning, and thereby realize the value of such
16. See SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMrIs OF MORALrY 357-69 (1991); Peter Railton, Alienation,
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 134, 148-60 (1984).
17. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 16, at 357-69.
2001] 693
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relationships, without the putative deontological reasons actually ex-
isting in any objective sense.'
Second, Hellman's deontological account of special relationships
might be criticized because of its moral cast. Hellman contends that
special relationships generate deontological, moral reasons. Conse-
quentialists will respond that special relationships generate conse-
quentialist moral reasons, while a third kind of theorist (call her the
"nonmoralist") will criticize both Hellman and the consequentialist
and will argue that the reasons generated by special relationships are
not moral reasons at all. This nonmoralist view is pressed by Bernard
Williams and Susan Wolf. 9 Assume that Sean likes chocolate ice
cream. This liking on Sean's part generates some kind of reason for
him-he now has a reason to eat some chocolate ice cream-but it is
far from clear that Sean has a moral reason to eat chocolate ice cream,
or that other persons have a moral reason that he do so. The same
could be said of Sean's parenthood of Sue: this special relationship
arguably generates personal but nonmoral reasons for Sean, perhaps
the same kind of personal, nonmoral reasons generated by his liking
for ice cream.2z
Why deny that special relationships generate moral reasons? One
worry is that special relationships need not be voluntarily assumed.
More precisely, the worry is that the reasons generated by special rela-
tionships are affirmative rather than negative-the reasons require ac-
tion, not merely inaction-and that it is unfairly burdensome to
impose an affirmative moral requirement on some agent when the
requirement does not flow from a voluntary choice of hers.2' Another
worry is that the putative moral reasons generated by special relation-
ships create an unfair advantage to certain parties to such relation-
ships. 2 Rachel's parents died young; Sue's parent, Sean, is still alive.
Would it not be unfair to Rachel for Sean to have a special moral
obligation to advance Sue's needs, goals, and welfare, with no one
similarly obliged to advance Rachel's? A third, quite different worry is
18. See, e.g., Railton, supra note 16, at 148-60; DAVID O. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 273-83 (1989).
19. See Bernard Williams, Persons, Character and Morality, in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS
197 (Am~lie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1976); Susan Wolf, Moral Saints, 79J. PHIL. 419 (1982).
20. Or perhaps not. Williams and Wolf do not claim that the nonmoral reasons gener-
ated by special relationships are just the same as other nonmoral reasons, such as those
generated by a liking for ice cream. Their main concern in the articles cited above, supra
note 19, is to criticize the moralized view of special relationships and other components of
a good human life, and not to delineate the various categories of nonmoral reasons.
21. See Scheffler, supra note 8, at 191-92.
22. See id. at 192-94.
694 [VOi-. 60:688
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that moral reasons (even deontological ones) have a universal quality
that is in tension with the partiality characteristic of special relation-
ships.23 The genuine parent gives special weight to her child's needs,
welfare, and goals "because he's my child," not "because he's my child
and it is morally required that each parent give special weight to her
child's needs, welfare, and goals." The genuine parent is directly and
immediately motivated by certain considerations; but if these consid-
erations were moral considerations, she could not be thus moti-
vated-or so it seems-since she would first need to deliberate about
their moral weight. Finally, one might wonder what it is about special
relationships that can generate moral reasons, as compared to other
features of the world (Sean's liking for chocolate ice cream, for exam-
ple) that apparently generate personal or prudential, but not moral,
reasons.
There is a substantial philosophical literature on special relation-
ships, in which consequentialist, nonmoralized, and deontological ac-
counts are debated. 24  Hellman does not take account of this
philosophical debate in her article. There are, of course, limits to
what can be covered in a single article, and I am not, in the end,
especially bothered by Hellman's failure to consider consequentialist
objections to her own views. The parties to special relationships do
give special weight to each other's welfare, needs, and so on, at least in
certain relationships, and I'm skeptical whether the consequentialist
can make sense of that. Note further that even on a consequentialist
account, the reasons generated by special relationships are moral rea-
sons, which suggests that Hellman's claims about the moral signifi-
cance of apparent wrongdoing might be translatable into
25consequentialist terms.
More troubling, I think, is the fact that Hellman does not defend
her deontological account of special relationships against nonmoral-
23. This point is emphasized by Williams, supra note 19, at 210-15, and has given rise to
substantial literature. See, e.g., OWEN FLANAGAN, VARIETIES OF MORAL PERSONALITY: ETHICS
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM 56-101 (1991); KAGAN, supra note 16, at 357-69; Dean Cocking
&Justin Oakley, Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation, 106 ETHICS
86 (1995); Barbara Herman, Agency, Attachment, and Difference, 101 ETHICS 775 (1991);
Neera Badhwar Kapur, Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and
Friendship, 101 ETHICS 483 (1991); Railton, supra note 14; William H. Wilcox, Egoists, Conse-
quentialists, and Their Friends, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 73 (1987).
24. See supra notes 8, 16, 18, 19, 23 (citing sources of such literature).
25. For example, a consequentialist could say that a party's apparent failure to engage
in the valuable activities constitutive of some special relationship of his is itself an intrinsic
disvalue. All agents have reason that parents act like good parents, plus an independent
reason that parents seem to act like good parents-or so the consequentialist could claim.
20011
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Voi.. 60:688
ized views.2 6 First, the various criticisms voiced by nonmoralists are,
collectively, quite cogent. Second, if the criticisms succeed-if the
parties to a given special relationship indeed have personal, but non-
moral reasons {RJ . . .Rn}-then any matching mimetic reason will
also be nonmoral. Each party will have nonmoral reason to refrain
from behaving in a way that some other party reasonably believes to
be nonmorally wrong, on the balance of {R1 . . .Rn}. Yet Hellman,
like other participants in the debate about expressive theories of
law,27 is interested in the moral constraints on government actors.28
The fact that some such actors have nonmoral reasons to refrain from
activities apparently inconsistent with their special relationships does
not imply-in any direct way-that they have moral reason to be con-
cerned about appearances, or to express or refrain from expressing
various statements or attitudes.
Let me turn now to Hellman's claims about the role of appear-
ances within special relationships. Although her deontological and
moralized account of special relationships is a contestable one, as I
have just explained, the account is not unreasonable and could at
some point become the consensus account in the philosophical litera-
ture. So I will henceforth assume the account to be correct. The
question then arises: if a special relationship, R, gives rise to deonto-
26. In response to this criticism, Hellman now states that her focus is "voluntarily cho-
sen relationships." Hellman, supra note 1, at 659 n.8. This response, however, addresses
only one of the various grounds I noted for thinking that special relationships might fail to
generate moral reasons: (1) the fact that some special relationships aren't voluntarily cho-
sen; (2) the worry about unfair advantage; (3) the tension between the universality of
moral reasons and the partiality characteristic of special relationships; and (4) the puzzle
of why special relationships would create moral reasons for agents, by contrast with other
features of the world that create personal or prudential, but not moral reasons.
Further, Hellman's decision to restrict her account to voluntarily chosen relationships
creates new problems. Hellman is now claiming, I take it, that voluntarily chosen special
relationships create moral reasons (mimetic and nonmimetic), while unchosen relation-
ships may not. Is "voluntariness" here the robust voluntariness required to create contrac-
tual and other promissory obligations? If not, then my original objection has not really
been answered: Isn't it unfair to impose affirmative obligations on persons by virtue of
special relationships that they've chosen only in some weak sense? And what is this weak
notion of voluntariness which does not rise to the level of full, robust choice, but is strong
enough to create moral duties? Conversely, if by "voluntariness" Hellman means robust
voluntariness, then one wonders why "relationships" are part of her account at all. Why
not say this: when a person promises, contracts, or otherwise voluntarily consents to un-
dertake some course of action, she creates a nonmimetic duty to do so, plus a mimetic
reason to refrain from actions that would apparently breach this nonmimetic duty. Does
Hellman think that promises between strangers fail to generate mimetic reasons, while
relationships do generate mimetic reasons, even though these relationships themselves
generate mimetic reasons only insofar as the relationships are voluntarily chosen?
27. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1367-77 & n.50.
28. Hellman, supra note 1, at 655.
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logical, moral reasons {R1 . . . Rn}, binding upon the parties to the
relationship, why think that each party has a further, deontological,
moral reason to refrain from a "mimetic wrong"-that is, to refrain
from some action reasonably believed by some other party to be
wrong on the balance of {R1 ... Rn}? When and why do appearances
matter, morally, within the context of special relationships?
At certain points in her article, Hellman seems to suggest that
every special relationship generates a reason (weaker or stronger) to
refrain from apparent moral wrongdoing.2 9 That claim strikes me as
too strong. Perhaps it's true that some special relationships generate a
reason to refrain from mimetic wrongs, but I don't see why all special
relationships would generate such a reason. Special relationships (on
the deontological view) arise when persons stand in a relation to each
other strong enough to trigger deontological requirements that are
owed to each other, analogous (in their deontological and relational
cast) to the requirements generated by promises and by other volun-
tary commitments. I see no necessary connection, conceptual or oth-
erwise, between the existence of such a relationship and the existence
of a specific type of deontological requirement, namely, the require-
ment to avoid apparent wrongdoing.
One response here is that all special relationships involve trust,
30
and therefore do necessarily generate the requirement to avoid mi-
29. See, e.g., id. at 658 ("It is because the [teacher-student] relationship generates duties
.. that the teacher should avoid appearing to do wrong. The relationship that the teacher
has with the students requires some accommodation by each to the needs and limitations
of the other."); id. at 665 ("[Tlhe less morally significant the relationship involved . . . the
weaker the demand on the actor to confine his behavior to accommodate those with whom
the relationship connects him."); id. at 665-66 ("The husband-wife relationship provides a
reason for the husband to respect the limitations under which the wife operates.... As the
man has no special relationship with the others who see him without his ring, he has no
(or only a very limited) obligation to take their epistemic limitations into account ...
[T]he relationship the man has with his wife (or other family and friends) is the source of
the obligation to take the limitations of others into account. Without a relationship, there
is no such obligation."). Cf id. at 676 ("[T]he appearance of wrongdoing provides a rea-
son to avoid action in situations in which the actor stands in an important relationship with
those who are likely to mistake her actions.").
As I noted earlier, Hellman has now restricted her account to voluntarily chosen rela-
tionships. See supra note 26. Even so, I remain unconvinced. In the text below, I argue
first against the claim that all special relationships generate mimetic reasons, and second
against the claim that the subset of special relationships characterized by a certain kind of
ignorance generates mimetic reasons. Those arguments carry over, I think, to Hellman's
newly restricted account. That is, the arguments undermine the claim that all voluntarily
chosen special relationships generate mimetic reasons and also the claim that the subset of
voluntarily chosen special relationships characterized by a certain kind of ignorance gener-
ate mimetic reasons.
30. Cf TRUDY GOVIER, DILEMMAS OF TRUST 12 (1998) ("Relationships really do go bet-
ter with trust; in fact, most go very badly without it."); Lawrence C. Becker, Trust as
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metic wrongs-the requirement Hellman describes. Trust is a con-
cept that Hellman invokes at various points in the article,3' and it
could perhaps be her view (although I may well be misinterpreting
her here) that the general linkage between special relationships and
trust is what makes the no-wrongful-appearance requirement a gen-
eral feature of such relationships. Consider the following argument:
From Trust to Appearance: Why Mimetic Wrongdoing Is Always
Wrongful (Within Special Relationships):
Assume Pi is one member to a special relationship and Pj is
another member, bound by reasons {R1 . . . Rn}. Then Pj
ought to comply with {R1 . . .Rn}. This implies that Pi is
entitled to trust that Pj will comply with {R1 .. .Rn}. In
other words, Pi is entitled to believe that Pj will comply with
{RI . .. Rn}. If Pj acts in a way, such that Pi reasonably be-
lieves that Pj has not complied with {R1 . . .Rn}, then Pi's
trust has been violated. In short, Pj has a moral reason,
grounded in Pi's trust, to avoid apparent moral wrongdoing.
I think this argument is flawed. Consider the following example.
Mike is my investment adviser. I entrust him with $10,000 for a long-
term investment. Mike has reason to maximize the financial return
on the $10,000, which is in fact what I want him to do. Further, I want
(and would want under ideal conditions) that return-maximization be
Mike's sole aim in managing my money. Where Mike is faced with two
investment options, such that the first will end up producing the high-
est returns over the long term, and the second will reasonably appear
Noncognitive Security About Motives, 107 ETHICS 43, 43 (1996) ("[Trust is] a crucial element
in the formation, stability, and productiveness of both individuals and large-scale social
organizations .... ). But see Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND
BREAKING COOPERATIvE RELATIONS 213, 223 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) ("Clearly, the
higher the level of trust the higher the likelihood of cooperation, but cooperative beha-
viour does not depend on trust alone, and the optimal threshold of trust will vary accord-
ing to the occasion.").
Note that one must not conflate descriptive claims about the prevalence of trust in
interpersonal relationships, and about the efficacy of trust in maintaining these relation-
ships, with the normative claim that participants to these relationships have a deontologi-
cal, moral reason not to breach each others' trust. A consequentialist might concede that
trust is essential to relationships, but deny that these relationships generate the deontologi-
cal reason just described or any other deontological reasons, and instead construe relation-
ships as valuable projects that everyone has reason to promote. See supra notes 16-18 and
accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 1, at 661 ("The judge has an obligation to the litigants
before him to avoid causing them to distrust his good faith."); id. at 665 ("[The husband]
ought to not give [the wife] a reason to distrust him."); id. at 668 ("The type of relationship
we have chosen with our [elected] representatives .. .includes an obligation to respect
normative trust."); id. at 661-63 (confirming that trust, specifically "normative trust," is im-
portant to Hellman's account).
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to me (for some time) to be the option that would produce the high-
est returns over the long term, I'd like Mike to choose the first op-
tion-even if the predicted difference in returns between the two
options is slight. In short, I want (and would want under ideal condi-
tions) that Mike ignore how the investment choices appear to me and
choose those investments that (he believes) actually maximize long-
term returns. Thus, it would not be a violation of my trust for Mike to
choose investment options that maximize long-term returns, even if
those options reasonably appear to me (unsophisticated as I am in
investment strategy) to be nonmaximizing. Indeed, the opposite is
true: what would violate my trust in this scenario would be for Mike to
sacrifice actual returns so that he can appear to me to have made the
maximizing choice.3 2
What this example shows is that we must distinguish between ob-
jective trust and epistemic trust. Where objective trust is at stake in a
special relationship, Pi trusts Pj in the sense that Pi counts on Pj to
behave in a certain way. Pj is obliged to comply with a set of moral
reasons, { R1 . . .Rn}, and Pj breaches Pi's trust just in case Pj acts
wrongly on the balance of {R1... Rn}. This is the investment-adviser
case. By contrast, where epistemic trust is at stake in a special relation-
ship, Pi trusts Pj in the sense that Pi feels assured that Pj will behave in
a certain way and counts on Pj to preserve this feeling of assurance.
32. Heilman responds, "even Adler would probably agree that Mike ought to explain
to Matt why he is choosing the investment that looks like it will have a poor return over one
that seems better on the surface." Id. at 662. I'm not sure I would agree with that. I
certainly wouldn't agree that Mike should explain his investment choices to Matt where
such explanation has costs (in time or money) to Mike. After all, Mike will spread these
costs to Matt through a higher management fee, lowering Matt's investment return; and
yet Matt's objective, we agreed, was to maximize his return. Matt would not want Mike to
explain his investment decisions to Matt if doing so would be costly and thereby reduce
Matt's return.
At most, then, I might agree to the weak claim that Mike should explain his invest-
ment decisions to Matt where such explanation would be costless for Mike, and therefore
would not affect Matt's return. But I'm not sure I'd agree even to this. Wouldn't Mike and
Matt have the power to draft a contractual provision relieving Mike of even this weak mi-
metic duty? If so, Mike would not have the weak mimetic duty in the case of a contractual
override. And even without a contractual override, shouldn't the existence of this weak
mimetic duty depend upon whether Mike and Matt would hypothetically choose to create
it, were they to fully specify the terms of their relationship in a contract? But my assump-
tion is that Matt cares about investment returns, not his own feelings of assurance. Thus,
there is no reason to think that, hypothetically, Mike and Matt would agree to place a weak
mimetic duty on Mike.
33. See, e.g., GOVIER, supra note 30, at 6 ("To trust people is to expect that they will act
well, that they will take our interests into account and not harm us."); Gambetta, supra note
30, at 217 ("[T] rust... is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent
assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before
he can monitor such action ...and in a context in which it affects his own action.");
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A relationship involves epistemic trust if the point or purpose of the
relationship (at least in part) is to produce a certain mental state-
specifically, a kind of assurance-for some party to the relationship.
My claim is that epistemic trust is not at stake in the investment-ad-
viser case. More generally, whatever the best analysis of special rela-
tionships-whether the reasons they generate are grounded in actual
social conventions, in idealized preferences, or in some nonconven-
tional source other than idealized preferences-it will not be the case
that all special relationships involve epistemic trust. Conventionally
structured relationships need not incorporate epistemic trust, and
persons need not prefer, or ideally prefer, that it be incorporated.
Thus, the putative argument from "trust" to a general relationship-
based obligation to avoid mimetic wrongdoing is flawed: relationships
need not embody the epistemic trust from which such an obligation
would flow.34
Becker, supra note 30, at 50 ("To say that we trust others in a noncognitive way is to say that
we are disposed to be trustful of them independently of our beliefs or expectations about
their trustworthiness."). None of these various definitions require trust to be epistemic
rather than objective. All allow that Pi can trust Pj in the sense of counting on Pj to behave
in a certain way (to perform actions satisfying some moral or nonmoral criterion), and not
necessarily in the sense of counting on Pj to produce a certain mental state in Pi. Cf L. W.
SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 81-137 (1996) (distinguishing between mental-
state accounts of well-being, which make a person's welfare depend upon his mental states,
and preference-based accounts, which make welfare depend upon whether the outcomes
that a person prefers actually occur).
34. Hellman replies to these criticisms by positing a different kind of trust-"nonrmative
trust"-which, she thinks, inheres in relationships and grounds mimetic duties:
For Adler, there is real, objective trust that is honored if Mike invests Matt's
money properly, and there is the feeling of trust (epistemic trust) that is served by
maintaining the proper appearance. What I have in mind is a different concep-
tion of the role trust plays in providing a reason for Mike to avoid appearing to do
wrong. I will call this normative trust .... The relationship between Mike and Matt
(or between the judge and the litigant) provides a reason for Mike (or the judge)
not to act in a way that gives Matt (or the litigant) a reason to distrust his good
faith.
Hellman, supra note 1, at 663. 1 fail to see the difference between normative trust and what
I'm calling epistemic trust. Consider Hellman's assertion: Mike ought "not to act in a way
that gives Matt ... a reason to distrust his good faith." Id. Assume Mike acts properly on
the balance of nonmimetic considerations arising from his relationship with Matt. In what
sense could such action by Mike still give Matt "a reason to distrust [Mike's] good faith"?
In the epistemic sense, and only in the epistemic sense, as far as I can see. Matt's "reason to
distrust [Mike's] good faith" is a reason for Matt to believe that Mike is acting wrongly. Even
though Mike actually acts properly on the balance of nonmimetic considerations arising
from his relationship to Matt, it could be reasonable for Matt to believe otherwise. But to
say that (1) Matt's beliefs about Mike's conformity with the relevant nonmimetic reasons
have moral weight independent from those reasons themselves, is just to say that (2) episte-
mic trust, as I've defined it, is at stake in the relationship between Mike and Matt.
If epistemic trust and Hellman's "normative trust" are no different, then my argu-
ments about epistemic trust apply equally to normative trust. First, epistemic trust does not
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Trust is not the only value seemingly invoked by Hellman to ex-
plain the wrongness of mimetic wrongdoing. At certain points in the
article, she suggests that inability to know is what triggers the obligation
to avoid mimetic wrongdoing. Specifically, she seems to claim that a
party, Pj, in a special relationship has a moral reason to avoid action
reasonably believed by Pi to be wrong on the balance of {R1 . . .Rn},
where Pi cannot know whether Pj has in fact engaged rightly or
wrongly. In explaining why the judge in Spires v. Hearst Corp.35 was
obliged to recuse himself for apparent bias, Hellman focuses on the
public's inability to know whether the judge was really biased:
[T]he obligation of the judge to take care to provide the ap-
pearance of justice to the parties whose case he adjudicates
grows out of the nature of his relationship with them. The
limitations under which they operate, in particular their in-
ability to know the reasons that truly guide his decisionmaking, obli-
gates him to attempt to appear unbiased as well as actually to
be unbiased. 6
An inability to acquire knowledge (or at least direct knowledge)
is also at stake in all of Hellman's specific examples of mimetic wrong-
doing: the teacher-student case, where the students do not perceive
what occurs at the female student's house;37 the "fake-fur" case, where
"the coat [is] a great fake, convincing to those who see it and
unadorned with a 'Great Fake' button or anything else that would dis-
pel the confusion," so that onlookers can't know just by looking that the
fur is fake;3  and the wedding-ring case, where the husband has no
wrongful intentions, but would have a mimetic reason to wear the ring
"[i]f the man's wife is unable to know his real intentions. '"" Finally,
inhere in all special relationships; thus, it does not warrant the claim that all special rela-
tionships create mimetic reasons. Second, it's not clear whether epistemic trust can
ground mimetic reasons in any special relationships, since epistemic trust seems to be an
essential byproduct," rather than something that can be directly pursued.
35. 420 F. Supp. 304 (C.D. Cal. 1976); see Hellman, supra note 1, at 660-61 (discussing
Spires).
36. Hellman, supra note 1, at 663 (emphasis added).
37. See id. at 658. Hellman explains:
The students can only judge by appearances. If we assume that they draw reason-
able conclusions on the basis of what they know and could reasonably find out,
then if the teacher refuses to be shackled by the limitations that constrain his
students, the teacher destroys something of the community between them....
The [teacher's] obligation to defer to the limitations constraining what the stu-
dents are able to know-call these epistemic limitations-springs from the teacher's
relationship with them.
Id. at 658-59.
38. Id. at 664 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 665.
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Hellman draws a link between ignorance and mimetic wrongdoing in
the conclusion to the article, where she states: "[in the case of] action
by officials that appears wrong, observers are hampered in their ability
to know whether the actor acts rightly."4 °
So what Hellman may mean to argue is the following: if some
party, Pi, to a special relationship, R, is unable to know whether Pj
complies with the reasons, {R1 ... Rn}, generated by the relationship,
then Pj has reason to avoid actions that lead Pi reasonably to believe that
Pj has failed to comply with {R1... Rn}. Let us call this the "Inability-
to-Know Argument." By "inability to know," I take it, Hellman means
some persistent or structural limitation on Pi's access to the facts
about Pfs compliance,4 such that Pi will not know that Pj behaves
rightly or wrongly even in the event that Pi's beliefs about Pfs compli-
ance happen to be true. The judge case, the teacher-student case, the
"fake-fur" case, and the wedding-ring case are all cases in which this
sort of structural limitation obtains-or so Hellman seems to
suggest.4
2
The Inability-to-Know Argument strikes me as problematic. Tra-
ditionally, "knowledge" is defined asjustified true belief.4 Assume for
the moment that the traditional definition of knowledge is correct,
and further assume that there is no difference between justified belief
and reasonable belief. Given these assumptions, the Inability-to-Know
Argument is false. Why? Pi, by hypothesis, is unable to know whether
Pj behaves wrongly on the balance of nonmimetic reasons {R1 . . .
Rn}. Pi's belief that Pj behaves wrongly on the balance of nonmimetic
40. Id. at 686.
41. See id. at 669 ("[Adler] correctly notes that the obligation to avoid the appearance
of wrongdoing that I describe presumes that there are structural barriers impeding the
onlooker's ability to know whether the actor acts rightly or wrongly.").
42. In these cases, as described by Hellman, the actor Pj---thejudge, teacher, fake-fur-
wearer, and husband-does in fact behave properly. But Hellman also states that the on-
looker Pi-the citizen, the students, the fake-fur-viewers, and the wife-does not know that
Pj behaves properly. See id. at 656-65 (setting forth these cases).
Further, Hellman doesn't suggest that the actor Pj couldn't behave improperly. The
judge could be improperly biased; the teacher could be having improper sexual relations;
and so on. And yet the onlooker P/-the citizen, the students, the fake-fake-fur-viewers,
and the wife-are unable to know whether Pj behaves properly. Pi is constrained from
knowing that Pj behaves wrongly, while Pj is not constrained from behaving wrongly. In
other words, Pi will not know that Pj behaves wrongly even in the case where Pj does behave
wrongly.
In sum, Pi will not know that Pj behaves rightly or wrongly even in the event that Ps
beliefs about Pfs compliance happen to be true.
43. See, e.g., JONATHAN DANcY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY 23
(1985) ("The standard account of knowledge ... defines knowledge asjustified true belief;
it holds that a knows that p if and only if (1) p, (2) a believes that p, (3) a's belief that p is
justified."). I do not mean to embrace the traditional account of knowledge here.
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reasons will not constitute real knowledge, even if that belief happens to
be correct. Given a traditional definition of knowledge, this inability
to know on Pi's part implies that Pi cannot form a justified belief to
the effect that Pj has failed to comply with the balance of nonmimetic
reasons {R1... Rn}." But if 'justified belief' and "reasonable belief'
are no different, it follows that Pi cannot form a reasonable belief to the
effect that Pj has failed to comply with the balance of nonmimetic
reasons {R1 ... Rn}. The only reasonable course for Pi is agnosticism;
a belief on Pi's part that Pj has engaged in nonmimetic wrongdoing
would be unjustified and unreasonable.
For example, in the judge case, if the public really cannot know
whether the judge's outlook is biased, then (on the traditional ac-
count of knowledge) they cannot be justified in believing that it is;
reasonable members of the public would not conclude that the judge
is biased or unbiased, but instead would realize that they have no basis
for a belief either way. The same analysis applies in the teacher-stu-
dent case, the fake-fur case, and the wedding-ring case: although the
behavior of the teacher, the fake-fur-wearer, and the husband might
cause the students, the onlookers, or the wife to believe that an impro-
priety has occurred, these beliefs will not be the reasonable beliefs as
to wrongdoing that Hellman makes an integral part of her account.
At least such beliefs will not be reasonable if the students, the onlook-
ers, and the wife are unable to know about actual wrongdoing, as
Hellman suggests they are.
Hellman might try to respond to these criticisms by driving a
wedge between knowledge and justified true belief.45 Or, she might
44. Strictly speaking, what follows from the traditional account of knowledge is that Pi
cannot form justified beliefs about Pfs compliance in cases where those beliefs are true. Pi
would still be capable of forming false justified beliefs. But it would be a very odd theory of
epistemic justification that precluded Pi from forming true justified beliefs, yet permitted
him to form false justified beliefs. I'll therefore assume that (1) Pi cannot form true justi-
fied beliefs about Pfs compliance implies (2) Pi cannot form justified beliefs about Pfs
compliance.
45. The traditional account of knowledge was shaken by Edmund Gettier's article, Is
Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYsis 121 (1963), which described cases where truth,
justification, and belief were all (seemingly) present, but knowledge was (seemingly) ab-
sent. One response to Gettier is to add a further element to the traditional account, such
that truth,justification, and belief are necessary but not sufficient for knowledge. Another
response is to stick to the traditional account, but to refine the concept of justification, so
that justification is actually lacking in the kinds of cases described by Gettier. See DANCY,
supra note 43, at 23-36 (discussing Gettier's objection to justified-true-belief account and
possible responses to it). If Hellman wants to address my criticisms by driving a wedge
between knowledge and justified true belief, she needs to engage in this debate about
Gettier. Specifically, she would need to adopt some nontraditional account that makes
justification, truth, and belief insufficient for knowledge. She would need to show why the
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respond by driving a wedge between reasonable belief and justified
belief.46 I'll not speculate about the plausibility of either response.
My point is simply this: on a traditional account of knowledge, it is
impossible for a person to be both unable to know that another has
done wrong and, at the same time, justifiably suspicious that the other
has done wrong. If Hellman really wants to argue that inability to
know is what triggers the requirement to avoid an appearance of im-
propriety,47 she'll have to probe more deeply into the nature of
knowledge than her article now does.
Let me return to the idea of epistemic trust. I've denied that all
special relationships generate a reason to avoid apparent wrongdoing.
I've also denied that a particular kind of special relationship-one
where some parties are unable to know whether other parties have
engaged in actual wrongdoing-generates a reason to avoid apparent
wrongdoing. I have not yet claimed that no special relationships gen-
strategy of refining 'justification" and retaining the traditional account is not adequately
responsive to Gettier. Finally, she would need to explain why her nontraditional account
allows Pi to form justified beliefs about Pfs noncompliance with {R1 . . .Rn} even though
Pi cannot know whether Pj complied.
46. In response to my criticism of the Inability-to-Know Argument, Hellman briefly sug-
gests that there is a difference between reasonable belief and justified belief. However, she
doesn't elaborate what that difference is. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 670 ("[T]he claim I
make is somewhat more modest than Adler suggests. I assume that the onlooker forms a
reasonable belief rather than a justified belief. While it is hard to describe the quantum of
evidence that differentiates these two, the first surely requires less than the second.").
47. She may not really want to argue this. Hellman now states:
It may be true that I have not used the term "knowledge" as carefully as I should
in saying that the onlooker cannot know whether the actor acts rightly or wrongly.
Instead, I should say that the situations I explore all involve a barrier to directly
observing what is going on.
Id. Her suggestion here is that the Inability-to-Know Argument should be reframed as an
Inability-to-Acquire-Direct-Knowledge Argument. Such an argument would run as follows:
where Pi is unable to know through direct observation whether Pj complies with {R1 ...
Rn}, then Pj has reason not to act in a way that leads Pi reasonably to believe that Pj has
failed to comply with {R1... Rn}. This argument avoids the criticisms I leveled against the
Inability-to-Know Argument. If Pi can know (albeit not directly) that P fails to comply with
{R1 . . .Rn}, then Pi can justifiably believe that Pj fails to comply.
However, I find it difficult to see why Pi's inability to acquire direct knowledge would
generate mimetic duties on Pfs part. The main thrust behind Hellman's original argu-
ment was that Pi's epistemic limitations required accommodation by Pj. See, e.g., Hellman,
supra note 1, at 659 ("The obligation to defer to the limitations constraining what the
students are able to know-call these epistemic limitations-springs from the teacher's rela-
tionship with them."). If Pi can form justified and reasonable beliefs about Pfs compliance
(through circumstantial evidence rather than direct observation) and can thereby acquire
knowledge about Pfs compliance, in what important sense is Pi epistemically limited? Al-
though Pi "can only judge by appearances," Hellman, supra note 1, at 658, if those appear-
ances are sufficiently probative of Pfs actual behavior that Pi can know what Pj has actually
done, why should Pj give independent moral weight to appearances rather than focusing
on actual compliance with the applicable nonmimetic reasons {R1 .. .Rn}?
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erate a reason to avoid apparent wrongdoing. Perhaps appearance
does matter, morally, within a subset of special relationships-if not in
the subset where parties are unable to know about each other's wrong-
doing, then perhaps in some other. Why not say, for example, that
relationships designed to reassure the parties as to each other's fidel-
ity-relationships where epistemic trust is part of the point or purpose
of the relationship-do oblige the parties to refrain from conduct that
appears to be wrongful?
Epistemic trust is certainly a value. It's a good thing to feel sure
that another is acting appropriately, where your interests are con-
cerned. But epistemic trust seems to be the kind of good that Jon
Elster calls an "essential byproduct."4 It can be realized only indi-
rectly, not directly. If I want to be reassured that Pj is acting on the
balance of {R1... Rn}, then I should not want Pj to take into account
my desire on this score. For if I thought that Pj were putting into the
balance not merely {R1 . . . Rn}, but also my desire for reassurance,
then I could hardly feel assured that he was acting on the balance of
{R1 . . . RnI. To return to the investment-adviser example: I might
want reassurance that Mike, the investment adviser, is maximizing fi-
nancial returns on my nest egg; but learning that Mike is (partly) mo-
tivated by the aim of reassuring me, and not solely by the aim of
maximizing returns, will be unsettling rather than reassuring. This
suggests to me that epistemic trust, albeit valuable, cannot be the
point or purpose (even partly) of a special relationship: that value is
disserved by giving parties a reason to avoid apparent wrongdoing.
Perhaps I am incorrect here. Or perhaps there are some
grounds, other than epistemic trust, for thinking that in a certain class
of special relationships, parties have both nonmimetic reasons {R1...
Rn}, plus a reason to avoid actions reasonably believed by some party
to be wrong on the balance of {R1 ... Rn}. 49 Such a special relation-
ship will be characterized by the following:
48. JOHN ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 43-108
(1983).
49. Hellman has supplemented her analysis by identifying joint participation in a com-
mon project as a feature of some (or all?) special relationships that supposedly generates
mimetic duties. For example, in the teacher-student case, she states: "[Given that] the
teacher and his students are engaged in a joint endeavor, each has a duty to consider the
perspective of the other. . . . It is this general principle-that a joint project requires
mutual accommodation-that provides a reason for the teacher to avoid action that ap-
pears improper." Hellman, supra note 1, at 658. My response to the joint-project sugges-
tion, briefly, is this: Pi and Pfsjoint project may or may not make reference to Pis and Pfs
mental states. For example, Pi and Pj may have the joint project of producing certain
beliefs, sensations, and so on, or they may have the joint project of producing a particular
state of the world, defined independent of their own mental states. In the latter case, Pi
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Possible Conflicts Between Mimetic and Nonmimetic Reasons:
The balance of {R1 ... Rn} may point in favor of one option,
while some party reasonably believes that the balance of {R1
... Rn} points in favor of a second option.
Mandatory Deception:
In some of the cases just described, the balance of {R1 ...
Rn} will only weigh slightly in favor of the first option. If so,
the actor may well be obliged to choose the second option,
that is, to engage in actual, nonmimetic wrongdoing so as to
avoid the appearance of nonmimetic wrongdoing.5"
and Pj would have a relationship-based reason to advance the project. But they wouldn't
have a relationship-based reason to provide assurance to each other that the project was
being advanced; whether the project is really being advanced, and whether Pi or Pj believes
that it is, are two different things. Cf supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (distin-
guishing between epistemic and objective trust).
50. A helpful example illustrating this point was discussed at the Symposium where the
papers comprising this issue of the Maryland Law Review were first presented. Imagine,
plausibly, that a rabbi has a relationship-based reason to keep kosher-a reason grounded
in his relationship to his congregation. Assume that the rabbi is faced with the choice
between two foods (one of which he must pick, or else he will starve): a BLT sandwich with
the bacon hidden from view, or a tofu cheeseburger that looks like real meat. If the rabbi
eats the BLT sandwich, he will break kashrut, but will appear to the congregation to be
keeping kosher; if the rabbi eats the cheeseburger, he will be keeping kosher, but will
appear to the congregation to be breaking kashrut. Assume, finally, that the rabbi's appar-
ent breach of kashrut will not have further consequences-it will not alarm the congrega-
tion or lead them to breach their own religious obligations.
I find it counterintuitive that, in such a case, the rabbi could be required to choose the
BLT sandwich. Moreover, I find that counterintuitive even if the breach of kashrut were taken to
be small, in the sense that this is only one food item with a small amount of meat. But
Hellman's theory implies that the rabbi would be required to eat the BLT sandwich-he
would be required to mislead the congregation-if the breach of kashrut were small. I
therefore find the theory counterintuitive. I do not think that actors can be obliged to
engage in actual nonmimetic wrongdoing so as to avoid the appearance of nonmimetic
wrongdoing.
Hellman suggests that my "mandatory deception" point is question-begging:
It is surely true that if the concern about how the decision will appear is to matter
at all-that is, to count as a reason for action or decision-it must be able to
make a difference. That being so, the judge will decide differently than he would
have on the basis of the nonmimetic reasons. But that doesn't mean that the
actor engages in actual wrongdoing. Rather, Adler is equating right action with
action prescribed by the balance of nonmimetic reasons. To do so assumes the
question this Section is addressing: whether one ought to take appearance con-
cerns into account in some instances.... We cannot assume at the outset that
right action is that which is mandated by nonmimetic reasons only.
Hellman, supra note 1, at 672. I disagree. I do not think that my "mandatory deception"
objection to mimetic reasons begs any questions. I did not say that the actor would be
obliged to engage in actual wrongdoing so as to avoid the appearance of wrongdoing.
Rather, I said that the actor would be obliged to engage in actual nonmimetic wrongdoing
so as to avoid the appearance of nonmimetic wrongdoing. And indeed he would. If an
agent's nonmimetic reasons {R1 ... Rn} point in favor of one option, and if his mimetic
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Possible Conflicts of Appearance: Interpersonal and Intertemporal:
The actor Pi has two options. Pj might reasonably believe
that one option is required by the balance of nonmimetic
reasons {R1 . . . Rn}, while Pk might reasonably believe that
the other option is required by the balance of nonmimetic
reasons. So Pi has an appearance-based reason for choosing
the first option and a conflicting, appearance-based reason
for choosing the second. More strikingly yet: Pj might rea-
sonably (albeit mistakenly) believe that one option is re-
quired by the balance of nonmimetic reasons and later come
to believe, reasonably and correctly, that the second option
is. Here, too, Pi has an appearance-based reason for choos-
ing the first option and a conflicting, appearance-based rea-
son for choosing the second.
In short, a special relationship where appearance matters, mor-
ally, will be rife with moral conflict-between what's really
(nonmimetically) right and what's apparently (nonmimetically) right,
and between what's apparently (nonmimetically) right from one view-
point versus another. This may be a conflict worth tolerating; a moral
view that allowed no conflict at all would be implausibly monistic. But
to show that the particular conflicts I have just described are worth
tolerating, Hellman needs to explain more precisely what subset of
special relationships generates mimetic requirements and why it is
they there arise. This will also help determine whether government
officials are obliged to avoid apparent wrongdoing: once the relevant
class of special relationships is specified, we can then consider
whether the relationship between government officials and citizens
falls inside or outside that class.
II. APPEARANCE AND EXPRESSION: WHAT'S THE CONNECTION?
Let me now turn to the second part of the article, where Hellman
distinguishes between appearance-based theories and expressive theo-
ries. To summarize her views: It is not true that an appearance-based
theory of governmental action entails an expressive theory of govern-
mental action. Only a narrower proposition is true, namely this: an
appearance-based theory of governmental action, together with a theory
duty to avoid action reasonably thought wrongful in light of {R1... Rn} point in favor of a
second option, and all things considered, the agent should choose the second option, then
he has indeed performed actual nonmimetic wrongdoing so as to avoid the appearance of
nonmimetic wrongdoing. Pace Hellman, I'm not assuming at the outset that this second
option is wrong. Rather, I'm pumping the reader's intuitions and inviting her to conclude
that the second option is wrong because it gives priority to mimetic over nonmimetic
considerations.
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of nonmimetic wrongdoing focused on the attitudes or mental states behind
governmental action, entails an expressive theory.5 ' However, Hellman
doubts that such a nonmimetic theory is correct.5 2 Therefore, she
doubts that the moral requirements applicable to governmental ac-
tion, or the constitutional provisions that incorporate these require-
ments, are systematically expressive in form:
[A] constitutional theory that focuses on the reasons for
state action will also require that the state attend to the ex-
pressive dimension of its actions. This conclusion is the
heart of what I have argued in this Article .... However,
there are reasons to doubt whether this way of conceiving of
constitutional protections (as prohibitions on reasons for ac-
tion) is justified. If not, one may still adopt a modest expres-
sivism-one that grows out of an understanding of the
content of particular constitutional guarantees.5 3
Note, to begin, that Hellman's denial of a general linkage be-
tween appearance-based and expressive theories-her denial of the
claim that every appearance-based theory of governmental action im-
plies some kind of expressive theory of governmental action-presup-
poses her rejection of a particular definition of "expression."5 4
Consider the following definition: action A expresses proposition P if
A evidences, indicates, or signals P, that is, if A is reasonable grounds for
someone to believe that p. 55 Assume, now, an appearance-based the-
ory of governmental action, such that actor Pj is obliged to comply
with reasons {R1 . . . Rn} and to avoid action reasonably believed by
some Pi to be wrongful on the balance of {R1 . . . Rn}. Then Pj is
automatically subject to an expressive requirement, given the defini-
tion of "expression" just offered. Pj has reason not to take action rea-
sonably believed by some Pi to be wrongful on the balance of {R1...
Rn}; equivalently, Pj has reason not to take action that expresses the
proposition, "Pj is a wrongdoer on the balance of {R1 . . . Rn}." By
51. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 677-81.
52. See id. at 681-84.
53. Id. at 683-84.
54. Cf Matthew D. Adler, Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic "Expression," and the Multiple
Variants of Expressivism: A Reply to Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1577,
1577 (2000) (noting that there are different kinds of "expressive theories of law" corre-
sponding to different meanings of the term "expression").
55. The philosopher Paul Grice, in his seminal article on the concept of "meaning,"
explains that an action, state, etc., can possess a "natural" or nonlinguistic meaning. PAUL
GRICE, Meaning, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 213 passim (1989). The definition just
offered is, very roughly, what Grice meant by nonlinguistic meaning. See Adler, supra note
7, at 1384-85 (discussing Grice's definition of meaning).
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appearing to engage in wrongdoing, Pj necessarily signals or indicates,
and in that sense "expresses," his status as a wrongdoer.
However, no actual expressivist employs this evidentiary defini-
tion of "expression." The expressivists that I criticized in my article,
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, equated "expression"
with linguistic meaning.56 Richard Pildes and Elizabeth Anderson, in
their recent article defending expressivism, link expression and atti-
tudes: on their definition, to express is to express an attitude, that is,
to manifest the attitude or make it recognizable.57 Given either a lin-
guistic definition of "expression" or the Anderson and Pildes defini-
tion, Hellman's denial of a general linkage between appearance-based
theories and expressive theories is quite correct. Assume Pi has rea-
son, {RI, R2}, not to cause physical harm to Pj or to destroy her prop-
erty. Then Pi has reason not to appear to cause physical harm to Pj,
or to appear to destroy her property. But some action, A, of Pi can
appear to cause physical harm to Pj or to destroy her property-the
action can appear to be wrongful on the balance of {R1, R2}-even
though the action (1) is not linguistically meaningful, and (2) does
not manifest some attitude of Pi's. Conversely, there is no linguistic
statement, or attitude, such that by uttering that statement or mani-
festing that attitude Pi necessarily appears to engage in wrongdoing
on the balance of {R1, R2}.
Hellman herself does not adopt either a linguistic definition of
"expression" or the Anderson and Pildes definition. Rather, in a re-
cent article defending an expressive account of the Equal Protection
Clause, Hellman equates "expression" with social meaning or public
meaning: "[T] he expressive dimension of a law or policy is best un-
derstood as the meaning that we would arrive at if we were to discuss the
interpretive question together under fair conditions."58 Here, too, there
seems to be no general entailment from appearance-based theories to
expressive theories. In particular, note that an action, A, can give Pi
reasonable grounds to believe some proposition, P, without it being
the case that A socially means P. After all, A might be contestable. Some
of us (deliberating under fair conditions) would take A to mean P, so
that linking A and P is reasonable; but others of us (deliberating
under fair conditions) would not take A to mean P, so that A lacks a
"social meaning" in Hellman's sense.
56. See Adler, supra note 7, at 1385-87.
57. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 7, at 1506-08.
58. Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 23
(2000); see also id. at 3 n.10 (explaining that the terms "social meaning" and "expressive
dimension" are synonyms).
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Rather, according to Hellman, what does entail expressivism is an
appearance-based theory that focuses on mental states or motivating
reasons. "[I]f constitutionally permissible action is action that is
adopted for the right reasons, then the government's relationship
with the governed provides a reason for the state to avoid action
whose meaning conflicts with constitutional guarantees. '"" This is not
true given a linguistic definition of "expression," nor does it seem to
be true given Hellman's own definition of "expression"-the social
meaning definition 6 -but it is true on the Anderson and Pildes defi-
nition. Imagine an appearance-based theory that enjoins parties to a
special relationship not to possess a particular mental state (say, con-
temptuous beliefs about the other parties to the relationship) and fur-
ther enjoins them not to appear to possess that mental state.6 1 Pj can
appear to possess the mental state without performing a linguistic ut-
terance; conversely, Pj can utter a contemptuous utterance without
appearing to be contemptuous himself (if, for example, Pj utters a
sentence whose conventional meaning is contemptuous, but it is clear
to the other parties that Pj does not grasp the conventional meaning
of the sentence). However, if some party reasonably believes that Pj is
contemptuous, then, necessarily, Pj has "expressed" his contempt in
Anderson and Pildes's sense: Pj has manifested that contempt to the
other party by performing some action in which contempt is properly
"recognized," that is, an action that is reasonably taken as grounds for
the conclusion that Pj is contemptuous.62 Conversely, if Pj has "ex-
pressed" or manifested his contempt to some party, then, necessarily,
that party reasonably believes (or at least could reasonably believe)
that Pj is contemptuous.
59. Hellman, supra note 1, at 680.
60. Pj can be reasonably perceived as contemptuous, without his actions possessing a
contemptuous social meaning-without there existing an ideal, consensus perception that
Pj is contemptuous. And would it not be possible for ideal discussants to agree in attaching
a contemptuous meaning to Pfs behavior while also agreeing that his actual attitudes were
not contemptuous?
61. A moral theory that focuses on mental states need not globally proscribe certain
mental states; instead, the theory might enjoin persons from holding certain mental states
in certain contexts. Here, too, an appearance-based theory entails an expressive theory on
the Anderson and Pildes definition of expression, but not on a linguistic definition or a
social-meaning definition.
62. Anderson and Pildes are not crystal clear in their definition of "expression." It may
be that the Anderson and Pildes concept of an action "manifesting" or "making recogniza-
ble" an attitude is narrower than I've described it here. Perhaps an action can cause an
onlooker to have the reasonable belief that the actor possesses a given attitude without
"manifesting" or "making recognizable" that attitude. If so, my claim here-that an ap-
pearance-based theory focused on mental states or motivating reasons leads to an Ander-
son and Pildes-type expressive theory-would be untrue.
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So Hellman is correct to think that, at least on one definition of
"expression"-the Anderson and Pildes definition-a limited class of
appearance-based theories do entail expressive theories. Hellman fur-
ther suggests that this limited entailment should prompt me to es-
pouse expressivism, assuming I'm persuaded by her argument in the
first part of the article in favor of appearance-based theories. She
states: "[w] hile this approach will not address the reservations of all
who oppose the expressivist conception of constitutional law, it will
address the views of some prominent critics like Professor Adler."63 I
demur from this further suggestion, for two reasons. First, as I've just
shown, appearance-based theories focused on mental states do not en-
tail the sort of expressivism that has hitherto interested me, namely,
linguistic expressivism. Second, and more fundamentally, my own
theory of governmental wrongdoing is not focused on mental states.
In my article, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Con-
stitutional Law,64 which Hellman cites,65 I contend that constitutional
doctrine is focused on the legal rules enacted by legislatures and other
governmental bodies.66 I do not there contend, nor would I now
claim, that "constitutionally impermissible action is action that is
adopted for the wrong [motivating] reasons."6 7 An unconstitutional
rule can be defined as a rule that is objectively wrongful-for exam-
ple, overinclusive or underinclusive. A rule-focused theory need not
in any way be focused on the reasons that actually motivate govern-
mental officials or some other mental states that they may possess.
In claiming that Hellman has misread my own views about mental
states, I hardly mean to gainsay the importance of the second part of
Hellman's article (or of the article as a whole). Hellman, quite cor-
rectly, distinguishes between appearance-based theories and expres-
63. Deborah Hellman, Judging by Appearances: Professional Ethics, Expressive Gov-
ernment and the Morality of How Things Seem 24 (Sept. 2000) (original draft, on file with
author). This suggestion has been altered in the final draft of Hellman's article. See
Hellman, supra note 1, at 677 ("While this approach will not address the reservations of all
who oppose the expressivist conception of constitutional law, it is relevant to many, and it
is aimed specifically at the dominant doctrinal approach to Equal Protection."). However,
I have retained in this Commentary my response to the original suggestion. As a staunch
anti-expressivist, I feel compelled to explain why Hellman's arguments for appearance-
based theories do not lead me to embrace expressivism.
64. 97 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1998).
65. See Hellman, supra note 63, at 24 n.33.
66. Adler, supra note 64, at 13-39; see also Matthew D. Adler, Personal Rights and Rule-
Dependence: Can the Two Coexist?, 6 LEGAL THEORY 337 (2000) (further developing the ac-
count of constitutional rights presented in Rights Against Rules); Matthew D. Adler, Rights,
Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: A Response to Professor Fallon, 113 HARV.
L. REv. 1371 (2000) (same).
67. Hellman, supra note 63, at 24 n.33.
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sive theories; she points out, insightfully, that there is a limited and
interesting connection between the two, centered on motivating rea-
sons; and she evinces skepticism about the moral importance of moti-
vating reasons, a skepticism I actually share. Hellman also, more
briefly, describes a second kind of connection between appearance-
based theories and expressive theories: "the question whether the ap-
pearance of wrongdoing ought to matter and the question whether
the expressive dimension of state action ought to matter are impor-
tantly similar in their focus on the actor's responsibility for the external
manifestation of his actions."6 This, too, is quite correct. If an ap-
pearance-based theory is correct, that is, if an actor can be held re-
sponsible for how his actions reasonably appear to others, then, a
fortiori, he can be held responsible for the linguistic meaning and for
the social meaning of those actions. Hellman's arguments in the first
part of the article, in defense of the claim that certain persons are
obliged to refrain from apparent moral wrongdoing, will (if success-
ful) have the ancillary effect of dispelling a particular objection to ex-
pressivism, one that rests on a narrow view of individual responsibility.
68. Hellman, supra note 1, at 655.
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